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Abstract 
This paper presents experimental evidence concerned with behavior in one-shot, finite 
repetition, and infinite repetition, two-person Reciprocity Games. Both symmetric and 
asymmetric games as well as games with explicit punishment actions are studied and 
compared. Along with classifying the group outcomes to the games, individual strategies 
are classified. The importance of alternation or turn-taking, group welfare, and equality 
as focal solutions is examined. Also considered is whether or not outcomes are unique, 
Pareto Optimal, or individually rational, and whether or not finite repetition treatments 
are subject to end-game effects. 
JEL Classification numbers: 026, 2 15. 
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1 Reciprocity Games 
1 
As described in Ostrom (1990), the farmers near the city of Valencia, Spain take turns 
directing water from canals onto their fields. When one farmer has taken all the water 
he needs, the next farmer, who has been waiting, gets to take all the water he needs. 
There is obvious temptation for the waiting farmers to try to take water out of turn; 
Valencia is hot and dry and the crops are in constant danger, especially in drought years. 
Remarkably enough, these tum-ta.king schemes have survived for centuries. 
The purpose of the turn-ta.king scheme is to insure an efficient, or a.t lea.st near 
efficient, use of the water supply. \Vithout the agreement to rotate, the farmers would 
waste valuable resources fighting amongst themselves over the scarce water. It is possible 
that farmers closer to the canals, or further upstream, would have an advantage in an 
unfettered contest for the water. The advantaged farmers might even be better off with 
free competition than with the turn-taking scheme. However, the disadvantaged farmers 
might be forced out of business, the total a.mount of crops produced might go down. By 
following the turn-ta.king scheme, the farmers avoid these potential problems. 
There a.re other situations in which turn-ta.king schemes can enable groups of people to 
exploit a resource to their collective advantage. Two firms, for example, can alternatively 
offer monopoly price bids in a series of contra.ct auctions. Without the turn-ta.king 
scheme, the firms would be forced to offer competitive price bids; the earnings of the 
auction's winner-would-be ·drastically reduced. Simihn·ly, two opposed politicians can 
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alternatively vote against their immediate best interests so that a string of bills, some 
of which please their constituents, will be assured of passage. If the politicians did not 
agree on a turn-taking scheme, their votes would cancel out and perhaps no bills would 
pass. 
All these situations ca.n be classified under the rubric of Reciprocity Ga.mes. A Reci­
procity Ga.me, then, is a.ny non-cooperative situation in which some efficient outcomes 
ca.n only be realized by utilizing non-trivia.I correlated strategies, or turn-ta.king. Re­
peated versions of classical games like the Battle of the Sexes and Chicken fall into this 
... category, ·pun>-e;oeFdi.nation·games .like The-Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma do not. 
As a.n example of a. Reciprocity Game, consider the repeated, finite action, two player 
game implied by the stage-game payoff matrix G1, where [ ( 3, 3) 
G1 = (7,3) 
(3, 7) l(4, 4) 
Label the actions A and B. Let the top row represent the payoffs to the row player for 
choosing action A. Let the leftha.nd column represent the payoffs to the column player 
for choosing action A. 
Assuming that both players a.re rational, or expected utility maximizers, a.nd that 
they have complete information a.bout the payoffs and the rationality of the other player, 
non-cooperative game theory offers certain predictions a.bout the player's behavior. The 
clarity of these predictions depends upon the number of times that the sta.ge-ga.me is 
repeated. 
If the stage-game is not repeated, ea.ch player ha.s a. dominate strategy, which is to 
choose action B. Play of this action a.t every stage is also the unique subgame perfect 
equilibrium of a.ny finite repetition game. In equilibrium, ea.ch player receives a. payoff 
of four in each stage. The equilibrium is efficient only in the non-repeated or one-shot 
game; in the repeated game, a.II the efficient outcomes involve alternating between the 
stage-game payoffs of (3, 7) and (7, 3). To gain these payoffs, both players must choose
their dominated action, and furthermore, the players must coordinate so that they do 
not choose the dominated action a.t the same time. Given a.n even number of stages, the 
simple alternation scheme of having the players take turns choosing action A leads to a.n 
outcome in which each player gets an a.vera.ge stage payoff of five. 
If the stage game is repeated a.n infinite number of times, the folk theorem implies 
that there are an infinite number of subgame perfect equilibria. In fact, there are an 
infinite number of efficient, subgame perfect equilibria.  The multiplicity of equilibria 
is in itself a problem for the players - which equilibrium should they coordinate on? 
Axiomatica.l concepts like symmetry, group welfare, or equality can be used to determine 
focal points, yet, even with these concepts there need not be a unique equilibrium. The 
efficient payoffs do share a common trait, however. In the efficient outcomes, the players 
must resort to a pattern of alternation between the stage-game payoffs of (3, 7) and (7, 3). 
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The purpose of this paper, then, is to examine the ability of people to enter into 
alternation schemes and achieve efficient outcomes to reciprocity games. The games 
will be studied under three different repetition conditions: one-shot, finite repetition, 
and infinite repetition. Comparisons will be ma.de between a. game that has symmetric 
payoffs and a. game that has asymmetric payoffs. The effects of adding a third action. 
one intended to be a clear punishment, will also be considered. 
2 Related Research 
As previously mentioned, Ostrom (1990) is concerned with examining the ability of people 
to efficiently exploit common pool resources. She reviews several case histories in which 
groups of people are able to introduce rotation schemes and successfully exploit the 
resource. Some of her examples have been in place for centuries. 
Ostrom et al. (1991) have abstracted from these real life examples in an experimental
study of the use of a common pool resource. In their study, rotation schemes offer an 
efficient way to exploit the resource, and, in fa.ct, some of the eight-person groups try 
to institute these schemes. Ostrom et al. find that these schemes fa.ii do to mistrust,
mistakes or cheating. The authors find that the efficiency of the use of the resource 
increases if individuals are allowed to impose fines on one another; however, resource use 
never reaches optimal levels. 
Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991a.; 1991b) and Cooper et al. (1990; 1989; 1987) have stud­
ied various public goods and coordination games that with repetition become Reciprocity 
Games. Cooper et al. (1990; 1987) also examined the addition of an action deemed to be
a punishment. They found that the availability of the extra action did effect the players 
choice of strategies. 
Selten and Stoecker (1986), in their work on finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemmas, 
developed a system of outcome classification that is similar to the strategy classification 
system used here. In their paper, either a Cooperative outcome or End-Effect Play 
occurs if the cooperative alternative in the one-shot game is chosen consecutively for 
m > 4 periods during the supergame. Unlike Seit.en and Stoecker, this paper examines 
the sequence of play at the individual level and makes inferences about the types of 
strategies that ea.ch individual plays, either Alternating, or Na.sh (or Other). 
3 The Experimental Design 
Ea.ch of four different payoff treatments will be examined under three different repetition 
conditions: one-shot, finite repetition, and infinite repetition. The four different payoff 
treatments are: symmetric (G1), asymmetric (G2), symmetric with punishment (G3), 
and a.symmetric vvith pu11ishment ( G4)1 and are represe11ted by the payoff rnatricies in 
Table 1. 
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3.1 Equilibria 
In the one-shot condition, G1 and G2 have either dominate strategy or dominate solvable 
Nash equilibria. In G1 the equilibrium is for both players to choose action B and then to 
receive a payoff of four. Name the outcome {B, B} so that each players move is reflected. 
In G2 the equilibrium, {A, B}, is for the row player to choose action A and receive a 
payoff of three, and for the column player to choose action B and receive a payoff of 
seven. 
·· G3 .a,nd. G4. both have .two additional -equilibria, . one in mixed strategies. In G3 the
additional equilibria are: {(�B, �C), (�B, �C)} and {C, C}. In G4 the additional equi­
libria are: {(�A, fC), (�A, �C)} and { C, C}. These additional equilibria are dominated,
in respect to both players, by the { B, B} equilibrium in G3 and the {A, B} equilibrium 
in G4• 
Unlike the finite repetition versions of G1 and G2, in which equilibrium play implies 
play of the unique one-shot equilibrium in each stage, in finite repetition versions of G3 
and G4 there are many subgame perfect equilibria. In fact, any minimax-dominating 
outcome can be approximated by a subgame perfect equilibrium if the number of stages 
is large enough.1
The set of equilibria in any of the four infinite repetition games is infinite. In fact, if 
the discount rate is low enough, any outcome to a game which results in average stage 
payoffs which are greater than the minimax payoffs is supportable as a subgame perfect 
equilibrium. 2
The minimax payoffs for G1 through G4 are, respectively: ( 4, 4), (3, 7), ( 1 % , 1 % ), and
(lf, l�). 
The axiomatic refinements of Equality, Symmetry, and \Nelfare Maximization, com­
bined with Pareto Optimality, pare the set of equilibrium outcomes down to a manageable 
level. The Equality refinement requires each player to receive the same payoff; the Sym­
metry refinement requires each player to choose their dominated action the same number 
of times; the Welfare Maximization refinement requires the sum of the player's payoffs 
to be maximized. 
In G1 and G3, the one to one alternation scheme leads to average stage payoffs of 
(5, 5) and satisfies all of these refinements. In G2 and G4, the Equality refinement requires 
a one to two alternation scheme. In this scheme the row player chooses action A half 
as often as the column player chooses action B and players end up with average stage 
payoffs of ( 4�, 4� ). The Symmetric refinement requires a one to one alternation scheme
and leads to average stage payoffs of (4, 5). The Welfare Maximizing refinement leads to 
play of the {A, B} stage game equilibrium and average stage payoffs of (3, 7). 
3.2 Hypotheses 
In describing the outcomes to the experiments, reference will be made to the following 
qualitative hypotheses, presented in order of least likely to most likely: 
Hypothesis 1 (Uniqueness) The outcome to the game is unique.
Hypothesis 2 (Pareto Optimal) The outcome to the game is Pareto Optimal.
Hypothesis 3 (Individually Rational) The payoffs associated with the outcome of
the game are greater than or equal to the minimum payoff that a player can g1tarantee 
himself using a pure strategy. 
All three of these hypotheses are concerned with the rationality of the players, or 
at least with their perceived theoretic understanding of the game. As a definition of 
rationality, Hypothesis 3 is very weak. In fact, every outcome to G3 or G4, under any 
repetition condition, satisfies it. Hypothesis 2 is more strict, it requires all players to 
coordinate on some efficient outcome. Hypothesis 1 is the most strict, it requires all 
players to coordinate on the same efficient outcome. The outcomes to a game will be 
called more predictable if the most observed outcome is seen a higher percentage of the 
time than the most observed outcome in another game. 
The behavior in the one-shot games should be considered as a calibrating device. The 
outcomes achieved are worst case outcomes in the sense that there is no chance for the 
players to use a.n efficient rotation scheme. Theory predicts that behavior will conform 
to the Nash Solution, which will be defined a.s Hypothesis 4. 
Although not equilibria in a.II cases, the following hypotheses will be considered for 
both the finite and infinite repetition treatments (notice that they do not specify be­
havior in the earliest stages of the game; they allow a period of time for the players to 
coordinate): 
Hypothesis 4 (Nash Solution) After a certain period, each player chooses the action
which leads to the highest Pareto-Ranked, subgame perfect equilibrium. 
Hypothesis 5 (Alternating Solution) After a certain period, the outcome to the game 
will have players alternating between action A and action B such that the realized play 
will be { . .. ,{A,B},{B,A}, {A,B}, . . . }. 
Hypothesis 6 (Welfare Solution) Afte1· a ce1·tain period, the outcome to the game
will be such that the s11m of the players payoffs is maximized. 
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Hypothesis 7 (Equality Solution) After a certain period, the outcome to the game
will maximize the sum of the playe1·s payoffs subject to having each player receive the 
same payoff. 
Hypothesis 4 embodies the predicted outcome in the finite repetition games. The 
Nash solution is also an equilibrium in any of the infinite repetition games, although it is 
not an efficient equilibria in the symmetric cases. Hypothesis 5 embodies the axiomatic 
refinement of Symmetry, it requires the players to adopt a one to one rotation scheme; 
-Hyp0tbesis ·6·embod-ies-the·il*iomatic-refinement .. of.-Welfare Maximization; and Hypoth­
esis 7 embodies the axiomatic refinement of Equality. Although not always equilibria, 
these three solutions are efficient outcomes to the finite repetition games. 
In the symmetric cases, G1 and G3, one outcome satisfies each of the Alternating, 
Welfare, and Equality Solutions, hence there is competition between only the Alternating 
and Nash Solutions. The asymmetric games, G2 and G4, were designed so that each of 
the three refinements identified a different outcome. In the Asymmetric games, the Nash 
Solution and the Welfare Solution are identical, hence there is competition between only 
the Alternating, Welfare and Equality Solutions. 
4 The Experiments 
All the experiments were performed in a laboratory at the California Institute of Tech­
nology. The experiments were run on a set of computers linked together in a network. 
The subject pool consisted of students, most of whom were recruited from introductory 
economics and political science courses. There were nine experimental sessions: one ses­
sion for each finite and infinite repetition treatment of G,, G2, G3, and G4; and one 
session for all the one-shot treatments. The number of subjects in ea.ch session varied 
from ten to fourteen due to the fact that some of the recruited subjects did not show up 
for some of the experiments. 
The following outline describes the order of events that took place in a typical exper­
imental session: 
1 .  Each subject entered the laboratory and sat at the terminal of their choice. 
2. The su.J.,ject-;; were rea�l a- set of. directions detailing the rules of.the session. The
subjects were not shown a payoff matrix, instead each action and payoff was ex­
plained to them independently. The subjects were led through two practice periods
and then quizzed.3
3. In a period, each subject chose either A or B (or C) and was then informed of their
payOff and partner's choice. Thls \Vas repeated u11der the following conditio11s:
(a) In the one-shot treatments, each subject was randomly matched with another 
at the beginning of each period. The game ended after 15 periods. 
(b) In the finite repetition treatments, each subject played the same person each 
period. The game ended after 1.5 periods. 
(c) In the infinite repetition treatments, each subject played the same person 
every period. After the 15th period, a ten-sided die was rolled so that the 
subjects could see the result. If a 9 was rolled then the game ended, otherwise 
the game continued another period after which there was another die roll. The 
.game.did not end until a 9.was rolled. 
4. At the encl of the game, the subjects were randomly matched with a person whom
they had not played and another game was started.
5. Each subject in a session played 4 games and was then paid cash for each point 
they earned in the experiment. In the one shot treatments, the order of games was:
01, 03, 02, and G4. In the finite and infinite repetition treatments, the subjects
played the same game four times.
6. The experimental session ended.
In the symmetric treatments, every player faces the same payoffs and therefore there 
is no difference between a row and a column player. In the symmetric treatments, all 
subjects were treated identically. 
On the other hand, in the asymmetric treatments, the labels row and column have 
meaning - the row player is at a disadvantage. In order to prevent row players from 
gambling that they would become column players, at the beginning of each asymmetric 
treatment, half of the subjects were informed that they would be row players for all four 
games in the session. In the one-shot session, this division took place after the second 
game. 
Table 2 reports the number of subjects and the number of observations, respectively, 
in each treatment.4 An observation consists of the outcome of one complete game and
two sequences of actions, one for each player involved. The table also shows the dates of 
each session, the length, the exchange rate, and the order of the one-shot treatments. 
5 The Results 
The results of the experimental sessions will be presented in four part data: the one-shot 
treatments' data, the finite and infinite repetition treatments' payoff data, a comparison 
of average payoffs, and, finally, the finite and infinite repetition treatments' strategy data. 
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5.1 The One-Shot Treatment 
The first step is to examine the player's behavior in the one-shot treatments. The Table 3 
describes the number of times each possible outcome pair was observed.5 
In order to determine whether or not an individual's actions changed as s/he gained 
experience with the game, the data was split into the first eight periods and the last 
seven periods and then compared using a standard x2 test.6 The results are shown in
Table 4. Notice that in no case is there a significant difference between the distribution
of.actions.at the .. beginning and the .distribution ofactions at the end. 
Hypothesis 3, Individual Rationality, is applicable only to the games without the 
punishment action, games G1 and G3; it is satisfied trivially in the other games. In G1, 
fourteen of the 1 50 observations, approximately 10  percent, assigned payoffs below the 
minimax to at least one of the players. In G2, sixteen of the seventy-five row player 
observations and six of the seventy-five column player observations, 21  percent and 8 
percent respectively, assigned payoffs below minimax payoffs. Even assuming tha.t the 
true frequency of below individually rational payoffs is the upper end of a 95 percent 
confidence interval around these observed frequencies, there is a surprising amount of 
irrational play, especially in the case of the row player in G3. 
The performance of the subjects gets progressively worse when considering Hypothe­
sis 2, Pareto Optimal play, and then Hypothesis 1, Unique play. The exceptions are the 
outcomes to G1, where three of the four possible outcomes are Pareto Optimal, and its 
counterpart G3. Between these two treatments, only 4 of 150 outcomes were not Pareto
Optimal. In the other two treatments, 39 of 150 outcomes were not Pareto Optimal. 
In no case does the addition of the punishment action significantly change the support 
for these hypotheses. These findings are summarized in Table .s. 
Although a large percentage of the subjects play the equilibrium strategy in every 
once-repeated treatment, there is a substantial minority that play non-equilibrium strate­
gies. In an ideal environment, Hypothesis 4, that each player chooses the subgame perfect
equilibrium strategy, would be rejected on the basis of even one non-equilibrium play. 
However, the criteria adopted for this experimental environment allows their rejection 
only if the upper bound of the 9.5 percent confidence interval around the observed pro­
portion of plays is less than 0.95. These bounds are displayed in the Table 6. Hypothesis 4 must be rejected for G1, and for the row players in both asymmetric treatments. The
fact that not all.peo.ple always play the .. unique, subgame perfect equilibrium strategy in 
one-shot games has been observed many times. 7 
Notice the significant change in the behavior of the column players when comparing 
G2 and G4• In G2, 8 percent of the actions chosen by the column players violate the 
Nash Solution, in G4 no actions chosen violate the Nash Solution. This is anomalous in  
that behavior does not change for the row player or in  fact between G1 and G3. One 
explanation for the data is that, because G2 and G4 were played in succession by the 
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same players, the column players learned how to play according to Hypothesis 4. Oddly
enough, the row players did not share in the revelation. 
5.2 The Finite and Infinite Repetition Treatments: Average 
Payoffs 
The outcomes to the finite and infinite repetition treatments are represented by the aver­
age payoffs of both players. In order to allow a period of time for the players to coordinate 
on a specific outcome, the first four periods are ignored. Also, so that the infinite rep­
etition treatments remain comparable to the finite repetition treatments, the averaging 
ends with the fifteenth period (the finite repetition treatments are fifteen periods long). 
Referring to Figure 1, the set of possible outcomes to G1 if it were infinitely repeated 
is represented by the triangular figme in both the top a.nd bottom diagrams. The solid 
dots in the diagrams represent the payoffs to the one-shot ga.me. Given tha.t a ten period 
average is used, the possible outcomes a.re a. subset of the triangular set. Actual outcomes 
to the games are shown by a. letter representing one or more observations. The letter is 
loca.ted a.t the coordinates determined by the average payoffs of the players. 
For an outcome to be Pareto Optimal, it must be located on the hypotenuse of 
the triangular set. The 45° line highlights the outcomes in which the players receive
equal payoffs. Every outcome located northeast of the dotted lines payoff dominates the 
minimax. These minimax dominating outcomes, given a. small enough discount rate, a.re 
subga.me perfect equilibria. if the game is infinitely repeated. 
In Figure 1, the top diagram represents the outcomes of the finite repetition treatment 
of G1. The bottom diagram represents the outcomes of the infinite repetition treatment 
of G1• Similar figures a.re constructed for the two treatments of G2, G3, and G4. 
In G1 and G3, there is no difference between a row a.nd a. column player. In order 
to a.void drawing conclusions from arbitrarily scattered outcomes, all the outcomes are 
located on or below the 45° line. In C2 a.nd G4, there is a. difference between a. row and
a column player. 
Again referring to Figure 1, specifically to the top diagram which shows the outcomes 
of the finite repetition treatment, notice that the outcomes seem to occm in two clusters. 
One cluster is located a.round the unique one-shot equilibrium or Na.sh Solution, point ( 4, 4 ). The other ffi·ioc.atedcca:roumJ-.the•focaJ solution, the.outcome that embodies the three
other focal points, the Alternating Solution, Equality Solution and Welfare Maximizing 
Solution, point (5, 5). The observations are divided roughly between the two clusters.
Although the Na.sh Solution was the most observed with five, fourteen groups were able 
to improve upon it using some pa.ttern of reciprocation, three actually implemented the 
focal solution. One player out of the twenty pa.irs received below minimax payoffs. 
The bottom diagram, which shows the outcomes of the infinitely repeated treatment, 
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1s m sharp contrast to the top one. Here, twenty-one of twenty-four observations are 
located at the focal solution. Of the three remaining outcomes, two are located near the 
Nash Solution, and the last is located at an outcome better than the Nash Solution but 
not as good as the focal solution. The extension of the time-horizon from finite to infinite 
draws many outcomes away from the Nash Solution and to the focal solution. People 
appear to have few problems implementing a rotation scheme and achieving efficient 
payoffs, approximately 90 percent succeed, if G1 is infinitely repeated. 
Figure 2 shows the outcomes to the finite and infinite repetition treatments of G3. 
Recall ·that G3 is· identical to GI' exeept· that an ·a.dditional action, a punishment, was
added to the action space. Despite the additional strategy, Figure 2 closely resembles
Figure 1 .  In the top diagram, the finite repetition treatment, roughly ha.If of the outcomes
are close to the focal solution. In the bottom diagram, the infinite repetition treatment.
roughly 80 percent of the outcomes are at the focal solution.
The top diagram in Figure 3 shows the outcomes to the finite repetition treatments 
of G2, the first of the asymmetric games. Seven outcomes were at the Nash Solution, 
point (7, 3). This point is also the Welfare Maximizing Solution; other outcomes were 
nearby. One outcome was at the Alternating Solution, point (5, 4). No outcomes were at
or even near the Equality Solution, point (4�, 4�).8 More than half of the outcomes,
eleven of twenty, have the row player receiving less than minimax payoffs. 
The bottom diagram shows the outcomes to the infinite repetition treatment of G2• 
Unlike in the symmetric games, there is no improvement in the efficiency of the outcomes 
as the time horizon gets longer. Roughly the same proportion of outcomes are at the 
Nash Solution, the Alternating Solution, and the Equality Solution (eight, two, and zero 
observations out of twenty-four, respectively) as in the finite repetition treatment. Again, 
half of the outcomes have the row player receiving less than minimax payoffs. If anything, 
the payoffs in the infinite repetition treatment seem worse than the payoffs in the finite 
repetition treatment. 
Figure 4 shows the outcomes to G,. Recall that G4 is identical to G2 except that a
punishment action is added. Unlike in the symmetric case, here the punishment action 
makes a difference. In the top diagram, the most observed outcome is the Alternating 
Solution, point (5, 4). This is in contrast to the most observed outcome in the finite rep­
etition treatment of G2 which was the Nash or Welfare Solution, point (7, 3). However, 
a substantial number of outcomes are still inefficient outcomes. The bottom diagram 
has these same features: the most observed point is the Alternating Solution, and many 
observations ·-are·:at·ineflicient outcomes. :Again, <lrawing·on.the similarity between the 
top and bottom diagram, infinite repetition did not greatly improve the chances of coor­
dinating on an efficient outcome. 
Ta.hie 7 shows the distribution of outcomes and the support for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 
3 in the finite repetition treatments. Clearly, the expectation that the outcomes are 
unique or even Pareto Optimal is unfounded. In fact, in the asy1nmetric game G2, even 
the expectation that the outcome is individually rational is unfounded. The addition of 
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the punishment action ma.de no difference in the support of these hypotheses. 
Table 8 shows the distribution of outcomes and the support for Hypotheses 1, 2, and
3 in the infinite repetition treatments. Surprisingly, the symmetric treatments. G1 and 
G3, exhibit strong support for a unique and Pareto Optimal solution. Unfortunately, the 
a.symmetric treatments, G2 and G4, do not follow suit and support remains minimal In 
the a.symmetric game G2, there is still little in the way of individual rationality on the 
pa.rt of the row player. The addition of the punishment action again made no difference 
in the support of these hypotheses. 
By examination of Table 9, it is clear that infinite repetition makes a difference in the 
symmetric games. The infinite repetition, symmetric games are much more predictable. 
In other words, in these games, the most popular outcome is chosen by a significantly 
higher percentage of the players. Also higher is the probability of obtaining Pareto 
Optimal payoffs. However, infinite repetitions does not seem to have any effect on the 
a.symmetric games.
Table 10 shows the distribution of outcomes over the focal point solutions and recon­
firms the evidence in Table 9 .  Infinite repetition makes a difference in the symmetric 
treatments - it results in a dramatically higher percentage of efficient Alterna.ting So­
lution outcomes. In the a.symmetric case, infinite repetition does not seem to make a 
difference, the distribution over the focal solutions remains similar. However, the addi­
tion of a punishment action ca.uses a shift from the Welfare Maximizing Solution to the 
Alternating Solution. In every a.symmetric trea.tment, a substantial number of outcomes 
are not efficient. 
5.3 Comparing Average Payoffs 
Table 11 shows the average payoffs in the one-shot treatments and in rounds 5 - 15 of the
finite and infinite repetition treatments. In the symmetric treatments, the average payoffs 
rise as the time horizon lengthens. In the one-shot trea.tment, the average is near the 
payoff associated with the Nash Solution, which assigns each player four. In the infinite 
repetition treatments, the average is near the payoff associated with the Alternating 
Solution, which assigns each player five. There seems to be little lost or gained from the 
addition of the punishment action. 
The a.symmetric treatments are much different tha.n the symmetric ones, the longer 
horizons do_not,imply,i.nore efficient-group payoffs. In-fact, .from the point of view of the 
column player, the longer time horizon is disastrous - especially when the punishment 
action is present. The a.vera.ge column player's payoff drops more than 20 percent when
moving from the one-shot treatment to either the finite or infinite repetition treatment 
of G4. From the group's perspective, this drop in the column player's payoff is not made 
up for by fact that the average row player gets a.round 10 percent more when moving
fron1 the one-sl1ot to either repeated treatinent of G4. Tl1e finite repetition treatment of 
G2 is the only one where the players improve upon the payoffs of the one-shot treatment. 
5.4 The Finite and Infinite Repetition Treatments: The Strat­
egy Space 
The following definitions divide the strategy sets associated with each repetition treat­
ment into three disjoint parts: 
Definition 1 (Alternating Strategy) An individual's sequence of play is an Alternat­
ing Strategy if, for every period in the sequence, the group's play in the previous period 
was {A;B} ·-0r {B,A}r·then�ndividu·a/!s-·play-in·this pe1'iod is B if last period it was A
and A if last period it was B. 
Definition 2 (Nash Strategy) An individual's sequence of play is a Nash Strategy if
for every period in the sequence, the individual's play corresponds to the action taken in 
the highest Pareto ranked, one-shot, subgame peiject equi:librium. 
Definition 3 (Other Strategy) An individual's sequence of play is an Other Strategy 
if it is not an Alternating Strategy or a Nash Strategy. 
It is possible to sort every individual's complete sequence of actions into one of the 
three previous categories. The Alternating Strategy category includes all strategies that 
try to alternate - dire punishment strategies as well as completely forgiving strategies. 
The Nash Strategy category includes only the one strategy.9 The Other Strategy 
category is a catchall and could contain many things, completely random behavior being 
one example. 
Table 1 2  shows the distribution of strategies for each game's finite repetition treat­
ment. Notice that in the symmetric games G1 and G2, the Alternation Strategy is picked 
most often. Also there is not a significant difference between the distributions, so the 
punishment action makes little difference. 
In the asymmetric games G2 and G4, there is a significant difference between the
distribution of strategies with and without the presence of the punishment action. The 
difference exists for both the row and the column players. The presence of Other Strate­
gies on the pa.rt of the row players in G2 shows that there were attempts at alternation -
they do not just play the Nash Strategy. Most of the column players, however, play the 
Nash Strat-egy. SB,-the--H>W players tend to eitl1er -give up and play the Nash Strategy
themselves or they punish their partners with the minimax. Most of them start playing 
the Nash Strategy. 
The proportion of players that play an Alternating Strategy in G4 is much higher for 
both types when the the punishment action is present. Note that the players never have 
to use this action, its presence is enough to cause the shift. A substantial number of 
players, both row and column, still pick an Other Strategy. 
In fact, in each of the finite repetition games, a large number of Other Strategies are 
chosen. One explanation for this is that there is conflict between the players, or they 
miscoordina.te in the early rounds. In any case, there is uncertainty during the game 
a.bout which equilibrium strategy, the Alternating Strategy or the Na.sh Strategy, each
player is supposed to use. 
Another explanation is that there are end-game effects present. With end-game ef­
fects, players who had been choosing their action according to the Alternating Strategy 
would change to the Nash Strategy before the last period. Unlike in G1 a.nd G2, in G3 
and ·G4 -end,ga.me effeds·woukl be · consistent with·many sub game perfect equilibria..
Table 1 3  reproduces each strategy distribution when the last two periods of play are 
ignoredrn There is, in fact, a. drama.tic end-game effect in both symmetric games; 
17.5 percent of the subjects switched from Alternating Strategy to Other Strategy in
the last two periods of G1, 20 percent switched in G3. The data from the asymmetric 
games, on the other hand, show positively no evidence of an end-game effect. One must 
conclude, then, that the Other Strategies present in G2 and G4 are due to conflict or 
miscoordination. 
Table 14 shows the distribution of strategies for each game's infinite repetition treat­
ment. Notice that in the symmetric games G1 and G2, the Alternation Strategy is a.gain 
picked most often. Also there is not a significant difference between the distributions, so 
the punishment action makes little difference. 
The presence of the punishment action also makes little difference in the asymmetric 
games, although there is some shift away from the Nash Strategy for the column players. 
The high number of Other Strategies shows that the conflict and miscoordination present 
in the finite repetition treatments is still there in the infinite repetition treatments. 
Finally, Table 15 shows the results of a comparison between the finite and infinite
repetition treatments. The null hypothesis in these tests is that the distribution of 
strategies is the same under both repetition conditions. 
The strong difference between the symmetric finite and infinite repetition treatments 
1s not surprising considering the presence of the end-game effects. What is surprising 
is the strong support claiming a difference between the finite and infinite repetition 
treatments of G2• There was no end-game effect present in the finite treatment of G2. 
6 Conclusions 
After considering the evidence presented here, it is not unreasonable to predict that some 
groups of people, like the aforementioned Valencian farmers, will be able to enter into 
stable alternation schemes if they are faced with situations similar to Reciprocity Games. 
The farmers a.re in a. symmetric situation, 80 percent of the farms are less than 1 hecta.cre. 
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The farmers are involved in an infinite repetition conflict; the farms have been there for 
centuries. Like most of the participants in infinite repetition treatments of G1 and G3. 
the farmers have been able to institute an efficient rotation scheme. 
In these experiments, it has been shown that people faced with symmetric Reciprocity 
Games enact solutions which are progressively more efficient as the time horizon increases 
from one-shot to finite repetition to infinite repetition. End-game effects have been found 
in the finite repetition treatments. In symmetric situations, punishment options play very 
little role. 
The ability of groups of people to obtain efficient outcomes if there are large asym­
metries between them is much more doubtful. As has been seen, there can be a conflict 
or miscoordination if the turn-taking and welfare maximizing solutions are different. Al­
though some succeed in instituting one of these two efficient focal outcomes, of those who 
fail, many get non-individually rational payoffs. Not a single group successfully instituted 
a one to two, or equal payoff, rotation scheme. 
Unlike the symmetric games, efficiency in the asymmetric games does not tend to 
increase as the time horizon lengthens. In fact., clue to prolonged conflict or miscoorclina­
tion, average payoffs in the infinite repetition treatments are below the average payoffs in 
the one-shot treatments. With finite repetitions, the presence of the punishment action 
causes an increase in the number of alternation schemes that are successfully implemented 
or tried, although the number of efficient outcomes does not increase significantly. 
Notes 
1 For example, for G1 repeated T >= 3 times,
[{B, A}i, {A,B}2, {B, Ah, ... , {A,Bh-1, {B, B}T] 
1.5 
with the threat of playing { C, C} for each subsequent stage if there is a defection is
subgame perfect. To be more specific, in repeated versions of one-shot games that have 
multiple Nash equilibria, for any individually rational and feasible outcome u there exists 
a length T and a subgame perfect equilibrium such that if U is the average stage payoff
in the equilibrium, 
llU - u!! < e 
for any E > 0.  The result holds for two-person games and for n-person games if the 
dimensionality of the payoff space is equal to the number of players. For details see 
Benoit and Krishna ( 1985); p. 919; refer to Theorem :3 . 7. 
2 The equilibrium payoffs must be such that the following equation holds: 
1 8 • 
l _ O Vi 2 Vi + l _ O Vi
1 • 1 t t --,v; = --,((1 - 0 )vi.min+ 0 vi) 1- u 1- u 
where v; is the average payoff of the equilibrium strategy given no defection, ii; is the
maximum payoff a player can get by deviating, vi• is the average payoff of the chosen
punishment strategy, and 8 is the discount rate. Equation 1 says that the total payoff for
playing the equilibrium must be greater than the total payoff for deviating once and then 
getting the punishment payoff for the rest of the game. For details see Fudenberg and 
Maskin (1986); pp. 53:3 - 554; refer to Theorem 1 .  In the infinite repetition treatments, 
the discount rate was ten percent. 
3 A copy of the directions and quiz used in the one-shot treatment of G4 is included 
in the appendix. 
4 There were 93 subjects total. An effort was made not to have experienced players,
however 7 did participate in two sessions. Two participated in 4/20/90 and 5/1 7  /90, 
one participated in 5/1 7  /90 and 5/18/90, and four participated in 5/1 1/90 and 5/18/90. 
These people were never matched with the same person more than once, even across 
sessions. 
5 In ABS, half of the subjects played A at least once. In ABCA, one subject was 
responsible for all the plays of action C. 
6 xf, here and elsewhere, is the standard test statistic using Yate's continuity cor­
rection. It has a x·2 distribution vvith i degrees of freedo1n. For a complete explanation
of this test, see Everitt ( 1977) pp. 12  - 14 .  
7 See Dawes ( 1980) and Cooper et al. (1987; 1990).
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8 The Equality Solution requires a one to two rotation scheme, i.e. row plays A 
once for each two times that column plays A. This rotation scheme has a three move 
cycle. What is exhibited in the figures is a ten move average payoff. Even if a one to two
rotation scheme was implemented, the ten move average would not give equal payoffs. 
However, any one to two rotation scheme would result in payoffs located on the Pareto 
Frontier and the averaging system used would locate the outcome withing 0.2 payoff 
points of the Equality Solution. No outcomes were within these tolerances. 
9 It is possible to have a sequence of plays defined as both an Alternating and a 
Nash Strategy. In the symmetric treatments, if both players choose action B in every 
round, each player's strategy will be put into both categories. Fortunately, no pa.ir of 
players chooses action B in each round, so the problem does not surface. 
10 Two was chosen because it is the minimum number of periods that allows both 
players a chance to defect from the Alternate strategy. 
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Appendix A: Instructions 
The following is a copy of the instructions given in the one-shot treatments of G 4. 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR A DECISION-MAKING 
EXPERIMENT 
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This is an experiment in decision making. You will be paid in cash at the end of the 
experiment. The amount of money you earn will depend upon the decisions you make and 
on the decisions other people make. We request that you do not talk at all or otherwise 
attempt to communicate with the other subjects except according to the specific rules of 
the experiment. If you have a question, feel free to raise your hand. One of us will come 
over to where you are sitting and answer your question in private. 
This experiment has 15 separate rounds and then it will end. During each round of 
the experiment you will be randomly pa.ired with another subject. You will never be 
paired with the same subject for two rounds in a row. 
Each round you will be given a. token which will be worth either 4 or 2.  It will always 
be worth the same amount. Each round you will be able to use the token in one of three 
ways: option A, or option B, or option C. 
PAYOFFS 
The amount of money you earn in a round depends upon which option you pick as well as 
which option your partner picks. WHAT HAPP EN S IN Y OU R  G ROUP HA S N O  
EFFECT ON THE PAY OFFS T O  MEMBERS O F  THE OTHER G ROUP S 
AND VICE VE RSA. In each round, you have nine possible earnings. These are shown 
in the following table: 
EARN IN G S  TABLE 
Your Choice 
A 
A 
A 
B 
B 
B 
c 
c 
c 
His/Her Choice 
A 
B 
c 
A 
B 
c 
A 
B 
c 
To summarize the table: 
Your Earnings 
3 points 
3 points 
1 point 
Your Token Value + 3 points
Your Token Value 
1 point 
1 point 
1 point 
2 points 
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1 ROW S 1 to 3: If you choose option A you will get 3 points if your partner picks
either option A or option B. If you choose option A and your partner chooses option 
C, you will get 1 point. 
2 ROW S 4 to 6: If you choose option B you will get your token value + 3 points
if your partner picks option A, you will get your token value if your partner picks 
option B, or you will get 1 point if your partner picks option C.
3 ROW S 7 to 9: If you choose option C you will get 1 point if your partner picks
either option A or option B. If you choose option C' and your partner chooses option 
C, you will get 2 points. 
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS: 
At the end of the experiment you will be pa.id 5 cents for every point you have accumu­
lated. 
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Appendix B: Quiz 
The following is a copy of the quiz given in the one-shot treatments of G4. 
QUIZ 
I. If my token is worth 4 points, the other player in my group will have a token value
equal to: 
i. 4 points.
IL 2 points. 
111. Either 4 or 2 points. 
1v. None of the above. 
2. If someone was in my group on round ,5 of an experiment, it will be certain, very
likely, impossible that he or she will be in my group on round 6.
3. If my token value is 2 and I choose option B and my pa.rtner chooses option A, how
many points will I earn?
4. If I choose option A and my partner chooses option C, how many points will I earn?
5. If at the end of a round I have 2 points, how much am I paid for that round?
The Payoff Tables 
G _ [ (3, 3) (3, 7) l 1 - (7,3) (4,4) [ (3,3) (3,7) (1,1)]
G3 = (7,3) (4,4) (L 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (2, 2) 
02 = [ (3,3) (3, 7) l (5, 3) (2,4) [ (3,3) (3,7) (1,1)]
G4 = (5, 3) (2, 4) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (2, 2) 
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Table 1: The payoff tables for the four different payoff treatments: symmetric (G1), 
a.symmetric (G2), symmetric with punishment (G3), and asymmetric with punishment
(G4 ) . 
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Experiments 
game trtmnt date subj. obs. length penny order point 
G, 0 2/4/91 10 75 1 5 1 
F 1/31/91 10 20 15 4 
I 5/18/90 12 24 
{61, 37, 4 17, 29} 
G3 0 2/4/91 10 75 1 5 2 
F 1/14/91 10 20 15 4 
I 5/17/90 12 24 
{20, 41, 4 26, 25} 
G2 0 2/4/91 10 75 1 .5 3 
F 2/1/91 10 20 15 4 
I 5/11/90 12 24 
{28, 19. 4 16, 20} 
G4 0 2/4/91 10 75 1 5 4 
F 2/1/91 14 28 1.5 4 
I 4/20/90 12 24 
{16, 29, 4 21, 24} 
Table 2: The date of each experiment along with the number of subjects, the number 
of observations, the number of periods, the exchange rate, and, if there were different 
treatments in one session, the order of treatments. 0, F, and I stand for one-shot, finite 
repetition1-and .. ffifinite·rnpetition, respectively. 
T he Distribution of Outcomes 
One-Shot Treatments 
G = [ 1 12 ]1 62 
G3 = [ 1 9 0 ]63 2 0 
G2 = 
[ � ·�� ][ � 58 �]G4 = 13 4 
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Table 3: The distribution of outcomes in the one-shot treatments. The entries in each 
table represent the number of times each outcome was observed in that treatment. The 
outcomes that satisfy Hypothesis 4, the Nash Solution, have been underlined. Notice 
that there are no entries below the diagonal in the symmetric games G1 and G3; the 
symmetric outcomes are classified together. In the asymmetric games, all outcomes are 
classified separately. 
2.s 
One-Shot Treatment 
Distribution of Actions, 
Periods 1 - 8 and Periods 9 - 15: 
G, G3 
periods 1 - 8 periods 9 - 15 periods 1 - 8 periods 9 - 15 
A 9 5 8 3 
B 71 65 72 6.5 
c - - 0 2 
x
2 0.3370 1.6290 
Row Players 
G2 G4 
periods 1 - 8 periods 9 - 15 periods 1 - 8 periods 9 - 15 
A 30 29 28 30 
B 10 6 10 3 
c - - 2 2 
x
2 0.2983 2.5813 
Column Players 
G2 G4 
periods 1 - 8 periods 9 - 1.5 periods 1 - 8 periods 9 - 15 
A 5 1 0 0 
B 35 34 40 35 
c - - 0 0 
x
2 1.2301 NA 
Table 4: For ea.ch One-Shot treatment, the distributions of strategies for the first eight 
periods and the la.st seven periods is shown and compared using a x2 statistic. In the
a.symmetric treatments, row players and column players a.re considered separately.
One-Shot Treatments 
Frequencies and Upper Bounds: 
Hyp. 1 Uniqueness
successes 62 63 
others 13 12 
freq 0.8267 0.8400 
high 0.8997 0.9107 
xz , 1 0.0000 
Hyp. 2 Pareto Optimality 
successes 74 72 
others 1 3 
freq 0.9867 0.9600 
high l.OOOOt 0.9978t 
xi 0.2568 
G, G2 (RO\"I) 
Hyp. 3 Individual Rationality 
successes 136 59 
others 14 16 
freq 0.9067 0. 7867
high 0.9460 0.8657 
53 
22 
0.7067 
0. 7945
0.5544 
,53 
22 
0.7067 
0. 7945
0.5544 
G2 (COL)
69 
6 
0.9200 
0.972:Jt 
t - significant a.t a = 0.05 
58 
17 
0.7733 
0.8541 
58 
17 
0.7733 
0.8.541 
high is the upper bound of the 95% c. interval a.round freq. 
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Table 5: For each One-Shot treatment, the breakdown of the outcomes between suc­
cesses and.�ersc:for:the Uniqueness;Pareto .Optimality, and lrnfrvi.dual Rationality hy­
pothesis are shown. Also shown is the frequency of success and the upper bound of its 95 
percent confidence interval. Finally, the distribution of observations under each hypoth­
esis when there is no punishment strategy is compared to the distribution of observations 
when there is a punishment strategy; A x2 statistic is reported.
One-Shot Contingency Table 
Hyp. 4 Nash Solution 
G.3 
successes 136 137 59 58 
other 14 13 16  1 7  
freq. 0.9066 0.913:3 0.7866 0.7733 
high 0.9460 0 .9514t 0.8657 0.8.541 
xi 0.0000 0.0000 
t - significant at a = 0.05 
Column 
G2 G4 
69 75 
6 0 
0.9200 1 .000 
0.9723t l .OOOt 
4.3403* 
* - significant by adopted criteria 
high is the upper bound of the 95% c. interval around freq. 
Table 6: For each One-Shot treatment, the breakdown of individual strategy choices 
between successes and others for the Nash hypothesis is shown. Also shown is the fre­
quency of success and the upper bound of its 9.5 percent confidence interval. Finally, the 
distribution of observations under the hypothesis when there is no punishment strategy 
is compared to the distribution of observations when there is a punishment strategy; a 
x2 statistic is reported.
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Finite Repetition Treatments 
Frequencies and Upper Bounds: 
G1 G3 G2 G4 
Hyp. 1 Uniqueness 
successes 5 8 7 8 
others 1 5  1 2  1 3  20 
freq 0.2500 0.400 0.3500 0.2857 
high 0.4174 0. 5894 0 .5344 0.43 1 1  
xi 0.4558 0.0249
Hyp. 2 Pareto Optimality 
successes 3 5 s 1 1
others 1 7  1 5  1 2  1 7  
freq 0. 1500 0.2500 0.4000 0.3929 
high 0.2880 0.4174 0.5894 0.5500 
xi 0 . 1563 0.0622 
c;1 G2 (ROW) G2 (COL) 
Hyp. 3 Individual Rationality 
successes 49 9 20 
others 1 1 1 0 
freq 0.9800 0.4500 1 .0000 
high l . OOOOt 0.6423 l . OOOOt 
t - significant at a = 0.05 
high is the upper bound of the 95% c. interval around freq. 
Table 7: For each Finite Repetition treatment, the breakdown of the outcomes between 
successes . .andcothers-for:the :Uniqueness, -Pareto -.Optimality, .and .Individual .Rationality
hypotheses are shown. Also shown is the frequency of success and the upper bound of 
its 95 percent confidence interval. Finally, the distribution of observations under each 
hypothesis when there is no punishment strategy is compared to the distribution of 
observations when there is a punishment strategy; a x2 statistic is reported.
Infinite Repetition Treatments 
Frequencies and Upper Bounds: 
Hyp. 1 Uniqueness 
successes 21  19  
others 3 5 
freq 0.8750 0. 7917
high 0.9907t 0 .9338 
xi 0. 1500
Hyp. 2 Pareto Optimality 
successes 21  19  
others 3 5 
freq 0.8750 0. 791 7
high o. 9907t o. 9:3:38
xi 0 . 1 500 
8 7 
1 6  1 7  
0.3333 0.29 1 7  
0.4983 0.4507 
0 .0000 
10  12 
14 12  
0.4167 0 . . 5000 
0.5892 0.6749 
0.0839 
G1 G2 (ROW) G2 (COL)
Hyp. ;3 Individual Rationality 
successes 46 1 3  23 
others 2 1 1 1 
freq 0.9.58:3 0.54 17  0 .9583 
high l . OOOOt 0. 7160 l .OOOOt 
t - significant at a = 0.05 
high is the upper bound of the 95% c. interval around freq. 
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Table 8: For each Infinite Repetition treatment, the breakdown of the outcomes be­
tween successesc:a;nd.-0thers for "the·Uni.queness, Pareto .. Optimality, and Individual Ra­
tionality hypotheses are shown. Also shown is the frequency of success and the upper 
bound of its 95 percent confidence interval. Finally, the distribution of observations un­
der each hypothesis when there is no punishment strategy is compared to the distribution 
of observations when there is a punishment strategy; a x2 statistic is reported.
Finite vs. Infinite Repetition Treatments: 
comparisons of levels of support using a 
XT statistic
c;1 
G3 
G2 
G4 
Hyp 1 Hyp 2 
Unique Pareto Opt. 
15. 1 375' 20.2958' 
5.5032' 10 .8174' 
0.041:3 0.0384 
0.067.5 0.245.5 
Hyp 3 
Ind. Rational 
0.0259 
0.0917 (ROW) 
0.008.5 (COL) 
* - significant at a = 0.05 
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Table 9: The statistics obtained when comparing the distribution of outcomes under 
the hypotheses in the finite repetition treatments and the distribution in the infinite 
repetition treatments. 
31 
Distribution of Outcomes Over 
Foca.l Point Solution Concepts: 
G'i (;3 G2 G4
F I F I F I F I 
Hyp. 5 Alternating 3 21  5 19  1 2 8 7 
Hyp. 6 \;lfelfare * * * * � 8 3 .s I 
Hyp. 7 Equality * * * * 0 0 0 0 
Hyp. 4 Na.sh .5 0 1 0 * *  * *  * *  * *
Other 12  3 14 .5 12 14 1 7 1 2  
* - Hyp. is the same as Alternating
* * - Hyp. is the same as Welfare 
Table 10: For each finite (F) and infinite (!) repetition treatment, the distribution of
outcomes over each foca.l point. solution is shown. 
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Avera.ge Payoffs 
One-Shot Finite Infinite 
G1 G3 G1 G3 c;1 (;3 
player 4 . 147 4.027 4.535 4.585 4.908 4.850 
group 8.294 8.054 9 .070 9. 1 70 9 .816 9.700 
One-Shot Finite Infinite 
G2 G4 G2 G4 G2 G4 
row 2 .785 2.725 2.955 3 .021  2.896 :3.029 
col 6.040 6 . 160 6 . 175 4 .757 5. 638 4.821
group 8.825 8.885 9 . 130 7.778 8 .. 534 7.850 
Table 1 1 :  The average payoffs in the one-shot treatment and in rounds 5 - 15 of the 
finite and infinite repetition treatments. 
Finite Repetition Contingency Table 
ROW COL 
G1 G3 G2 G4 G2 G4 
Alt. 2 1  23 0 1 1 4 10 
Nash 6 4 2 2 15  4 
Other 1 3  1 3  18  15  1 14 
x22 0.4909 1 0.2234* 1 9.4124* 
* - significant at a = 0.05 
Table 12 :  In each Finite Repetition treatment, the distribution of strategy choices is 
shown. The distribution of strategies when there is no punishment strategy is compared 
to the distribution of strategies when there is a punishment strategy; a x2 statistic is
reported. 
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Finite Repetition, 
-Strategy. Distributions, 
All Periods and All But the Last 2 Periods: 
G1 G3 
all periods all periods - 2 all periods all periods - 2 
Alt. 21  28 2:3 :30 
Nash 6 6 4 5 
Other 1 3  6 1 3  ,5 
Row Players 
G2 G4 
aII periods all periods - 2 all periods all periods - 2 
Alt. 0 0 1 1 1 1
Nash 2 2 2 2 
Other 18  18  15  15  
Column P la ye rs 
G2 G4 
all periods all periods - 2 all periods all periods - 2 
Alt. 4 4 10  10  
Nash 15  1.5 4 5 
Other 1 1 14 1:3 
Table 1:3 :  The different strategy distributions over the focal solutions obta.ined when all
periods a.re taken into account and .also when al.I.but the last two periods are taken into
account are displayed for ea.ch finite repetition treatment. 
Infinite Repetition Contingency Table 
ROW COL 
c;1 G3 G2 G4 G2 G4 
Alt. 42 40 6 6 2 7 
Nash 2 1 6 4 1 2  6 
Other 4 7 1 2  1 4  1 0  1 1  
x2" 2 1 .2003 0 .. 5538 4.82.54 
* - significant at o: = 0.0.5
Table 14: In each Infinite Repetition treatment, the distribution of strategy choices is 
shown. The distribution of strategies when there is no punishment strategy is compared 
to the distribution of strategies when there is a punishment strategy; a x2 statistic is
reported. 
Finite vs. Infinite Repetition Treatments: 
x� Sta.tistic
H0: strategy distributions are identical.
G1 
G3 
G2 
G4 
ROvV 
1 0.4159* 
5 .2,178 
5 .9927* 
0. 7889
CO! 
.5 .6:341 
0 .34:35 
* - significant at a = 0.05 
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Table 1 5: The statistics obtained when comparing the distribution of strategy choices in
the finite repetition trea.tments and the distribution in the infinite repetition treatments. 
G , ,  Finite 
A - 1 
B - 3 
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Figure 1: · The outcomes to the repeated treatments of G1. The top diagram shows the
finite repetition treatment, the bottom diagram shows the infinite repetition treatment. 
Each letter represents one or more outcomes. The dots show the payoffs to the stage 
game. Every outcome on or to the northeast of the dotted line dominates each players 
minimax payoff. The 45° line represents equal payoffs.
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Figure 2: The outcomes to the repeated treatments of G3. The top diagram shows the 
finite repetition treatment, the bottom diagram shows the infinite repetition treatment. 
Each letter represents one or more outcomes. The dots show the payoffs to the stage 
game. Every outcome on or to the northeast of the dotted line dominates each players 
minimax payoff. The 45° line represents equal payoffs.
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Figure 3: The outcomes to the repeated treatments of G2• The top diagram shows the 
finite repetition treatment, the bottom diagram shows the infinite repetition treatment. 
Each letter represents one or more outcomes. The dots show the payoffs to the stage 
game. Every outcome on or to the northeast of the dotted line dominates each players 
minimax payoff. The 45° line represents equal payoffs.
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Figure 4: The outcomes to the repeated treatments of G4• The top diagram shows the
finite repetition treatment, the bottom diagram shows the infinite repetition treatment. 
Each letter represents one or more outcomes. The dots show the payoffs to the stage 
game. Every outcome on or to the northeast of the dotted line dominates each players 
minimax payoff. The 45° line represents equal payoffs.
